Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,

for inviting me to appear before you today to speak about

the implementation of a possible agreement with North Korea for

the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement, that is,

CVID, of its nuclear weapons program.

As you know, I was very much involved in the original Nunn-

Lugar program, which was a very successful effort established by

you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Nunn. It accomplished CVID in

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus and also diminished, dismantled,

and secured a large portion of the nuclear weapons legacy of

the Soviet Union inherited by Russia. These very same methods,

Nunn-Lugar methods, are at work today in Libya, in Iraq, and in

securing highly enriched uranium around the world. We all hope

that something similar can be done in North Korea.

I would like to share with you nine recommendations about how

we might do that. But before I get there, I do not want to put the

cart before the horse. I have to say that in my estimation, we are

a long way from an agreement with North Korea on CVID. I do not

know whether at this point North Korea is susceptible to a diplomatic

solution to the nuclear crisis at all. President Bush is correct

to give diplomacy a try before moving to other more coercive paths,

but I think we have to look at it as only a try.

The alternatives to diplomacy are dangerous because they could

spark a violent war on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, they

cannot be fully effective unless others join us in implementing

them. For example, economic penalties cannot be effectively imposed

on North Korea, if diplomacy fails, unless China, South

Korea, and Russia agree not to undercut those penalties. We need

international support on either path, whether diplomatic or more

coercive. This is not a matter of getting a permission slip from anyone;

it is a matter of making our policy more effective. And we are

not going to get that support for a more coercive path unless and

until the diplomatic path has been tried and has been shown to

have failed.

The last time I appeared before this committee, I called for a

total overhaul of U.S. counter-proliferation capabilities. I argued

that President Bush was absolutely right when he said that keeping

the worst weapons out of the hands of the worst people was the

highest national security priority for any American President. But

I also pointed out that U.S. policy in recent years has focused mostly

on the worst people and far too little on the worst weapons. We

have waged a war on terrorism but have not yet begun a parallel

war on weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the only major action

taken against weapons of mass destruction was the invasion of

Iraq, which was an action I supported, in the firm conviction that

Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction would be found

after the war. But it turns out that pre-war intelligence falsely

overstated Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Meanwhile, as all eyes were on Iraq, North Korea and Iran

plunged forward with their nuclear programs. Efforts to secure materials

in Russia and worldwide proceeded at their pre-9/11 bureaucratic

pace, and the Department of Homeland Security, the Department

of Defense and the intelligence community continued to give

inadequate attention to overhauling their counter-proliferation programs

to deal with the age of terrorism.

The most adverse of all these recent developments in counter-proliferation

has taken place in North Korea. The North quadrupled

its stock of plutonium in the most significant proliferation

disaster since Pakistan went nuclear in the 1980s under the scientific

leadership of A.Q. Khan. Letting North Korea go nuclear

would represent a security catastrophe for the United States in no

fewer than five ways.

First, it would weaken deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and

make destructive war there both more likely and more destructive.

Second, it could lead to a domino effect of proliferation in East

Asia, as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others reconsider their

decisions to forego nuclear weapons.

Third, it would undercut the global nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty regime.

Fourth, North Korea might well sell plutonium as it sells ballistic

missiles.

And fifth, if North Korea collapses, we will need to worry about

where its plutonium goes during the upheaval.

These last two points alone illustrate why a nuclear North Korea

is unacceptable to U.S. and international security, because they

show that proliferation to states is also a potential route to substate

nuclear terrorism.

For these five reasons, the United States must put stopping the

nuclear program first in its priorities in dealing with North Korea,

above reducing North Korea’s conventional forces, and above transforming

its repressive political system and backward economic system.

Strategy is about priorities. These other objectives remain important

U.S. goals, but the Bush administration is correct to put

nuclear CVID at the center of its negotiating strategy.

Unfortunately, the U.S. negotiating position has deteriorated significantly

since the crisis began in late 2002, when North Korea’s

plutonium program was unfrozen and its uranium enrichment program

revealed. For the 8 preceding years, the 8,000 fuel rods containing

several bombs’ worth of weapons grade plutonium were at

Yongbyon, where they could be inspected—or, for that matter, destroyed—

and were months away from being converted into bomb

form. Now they are out of Yongbyon, location unknown, and presumably

at least some of them have been reprocessed to extract

bomb-ready plutonium.

The U.S. position among other parties in the region has also

taken a turn for the worse. South Korea and China have the power

to reward and coerce North Korea—they possess carrots and sticks

that are at least as potent as ours—if they can be persuaded to

wield them in the nuclear diplomacy. But in the absence of a clear

U.S. negotiating strategy, each of these partners has begun to go

its own way.

In South Korea, a younger generation seems to have lost its strategic

bearings entirely, wishing away the North Korean threat and

even going so far as to make the astonishing suggestion that the

United States is the greater threat. The older generation of South

Korean leaders has done too little to educate the younger generation

about the South’s actual interests and responsibilities. The

United States has exacerbated this situation through 31⁄2 years of

delay in formulating a negotiating strategy, and by its clumsy handling

of its plans to rebase U.S. forces on the peninsula.

China should apply its full weight to pressuring North Korea to

agree to a reasonable U.S. negotiating position. But in the absence

of a clear U.S. position, China has also been looking the other way

as North Korea advances its nuclear program. In fact, China and

South Korea appear to be collaborating closely. This is a symptom

of a larger trend in East Asia, where China’s power and influence

grow and regional states find themselves tempted to align with

China and move away from the United States. Our government’s

near-total focus on the Middle East has kept us from countering

this trend toward the erosion of the U.S. strategic position in East

Asia.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I therefore approach

my assigned task in this hearing with grave doubts. But in

the spirit of hope, allow me to make some observations on how the

Nunn-Lugar method might be applied in implementing a

denuclearization agreement with North Korea.

First, Nunn-Lugar-like assistance with CVID is a reasonable carrot

for the United States to offer North Korea. This Nation, always

loath to bribe North Korea, and burned once in the Agreed Framework

by North Korean cheating, can hardly be expected to give

North Korea large tangible rewards for stepping back from the nuclear

threshold. It is likely that South Korea, China, Russia, and

Japan will do so but not the United States.

But the U.S. can reasonably offer two carrots. The first is an intangible:

namely, a pledge not to attack North Korea if it foregoes

nuclear weapons. This simply makes explicit what should be our

policy anyway. The second is Nunn-Lugar-like assistance with

CVID. Such assistance, like the Nunn-Lugar program in general,

should be seen as an investment in our own security, not a reward

to North Korea. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used to call the

Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union ‘‘defense by other

means.’’

Second, while CVID must be the end state prescribed in any

agreement, as a practical matter this state will be approached in

stages. Recall that the Agreed Framework also prescribed CVID of

North Korea’s plutonium infrastructure. Its uranium provisions

were not verifiable and, sure enough, North Korea cheated on

them. The problem with the Agreed Framework’s plutonium provisions

was not that it did not have the right goal, or that it approached

that goal in stages. The problem was that implementation

never progressed beyond the first stage, the so-called freeze. We

need to make sure any new agreement does not get stuck in an

early stage of implementation. The agreement will need to build in

penalties to North Korea for stalling. On our side, Congress especially

will need to support the implementation of the agreement

over time and over successive administrations until CVID is

achieved. With the Agreed Framework, first Congress and then the

Clinton administration betrayed signs of buyer’s regret soon after

the agreement was signed, and this played into the hands of North

Korea’s desire to stall at the freeze stage.

Third, the United States should begin program design for CVID

now. The program design should include technical objectives and

milestones, supply and construction plans, estimated costs, and a

program management structure giving clear authority and accountability

to a single U.S. official. This last point is important. Over

the history of the Nunn-Lugar program, its projects have been implemented

by Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce. These Departments

have developed expertise in these types of projects and

it would be imprudent not to exploit it for the North Korea program.

But we cannot confront North Korea with the same bureaucratic

chaos with which the states of the former Soviet Union still

contend.

The program design should be shown to the North Koreans and

their input solicited. Doing so will smooth things down the road if

an agreement is reached, and it might even whet their appetite for

such an agreement in the first place.

Obviously a program plan can only be notional at this stage and

will need to be refined as we learn more about North Korea’s nuclear

infrastructure. Without a specific program plan, it is difficult

to estimate costs. But a reasonable estimate would be that the

North Korea Nunn-Lugar program would be a factor of ten smaller

than the former Soviet Union program—that is, tens of millions of

dollars per year for a 10-year period.

Fifth, by far the preferable role for congressional oversight is to

review the program plan in advance as it considers the overall wisdom

of any agreement the executive branch reaches with North

Korea. To the extent possible, we should avoid a situation in which

every stage of implementation and every needed appropriation for

assistance becomes a mini-crisis in U.S. politics. The North will exploit

such crises to stall and re-bargain the agreement. The result

will be to the U.S. disadvantage in the long run. Well-intentioned

but totally counterproductive congressional restrictions have greatly

damaged the denuclearization effort in the former Soviet Union.

To yield results that are complete, the ‘‘C’’ in CVID, and irreversible,

the ‘‘I’’ in CVID, the Nunn-Lugar concept for North Korea, like

that for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, should cover all portions

of the nuclear infrastructure: weapons and materials, production

and storage facilities, R&D centers, and the scientists and

workers who populate it.

Seventh, verification, the ‘‘V’’ in CVID, will be aided by a Nunn-

Lugar approach. A cooperative effort in which the United States is

deeply involved, on the ground and in person with North Korean

technologists, will give important insights and confidence to complement

formal verification measures and national intelligence collection.

Eighth, while in principle other nations in the six-party talks

could also provide Nunn-Lugar type assistance to implement an

agreement, it is probably preferable that the program to implement

the agreement be U.S. only. The United States has the expertise

of the existing Nunn-Lugar program under its belt, an enormous

incentive to see CVID succeed, and a disinclination to provide other

types of assistance to North Korea that China, Russia, South

Korea, and Japan might provide.

Ninth and finally, elimination of chemical and biological weapons

and ballistic missiles can be added to the agreement and to the resulting

Nunn-Lugar program, though with lesser priority than nuclear

weapons. Chemical weapons are not much more destructive,

pound for pound or liter for liter, than conventional weapons and

hardly deserve the mass destruction designation. Biological weapons

are a true weapon of mass destruction, but the United States

must formulate strong counters against biowarfare and bioterrorism

irrespective of North Korea, and these countermeasures, if

taken, will likely provide comparable protection against North Korean

bioweapons. And ballistic missiles are a poor way for an

attacker to spend money unless they carry nuclear and biological

warheads. So our concerns about missiles end up being derivative

of these weapons. For these reasons I think it is safe to sequence

these other weapon types after nuclear weapons from a purely military

perspective.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me close by

stressing that policymaking and implementation are different processes

requiring different skills. Too often our policy is brilliant, but

when it comes to spending the taxpayers’ money on complex and

novel technical projects, especially in foreign lands, our performance

is less than brilliant. Joint military operations are, fortunately,

an exception to this observation. But when one considers

the fumbling in the early years of the Nunn-Lugar program in the

former Soviet Union, to which I can attest personally, the first year

of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, the first 3 years of

the U.S. Homeland Security program, one can easily see that successful

implementation is not always assured even when the policy

objectives are crystal clear. The complexity of a North Korea CVID

program based on the Nunn-Lugar precedent, together with the inimitable

qualities of the North Korean Government, mean that implementation

will require stamina and finesse on the part of both

the executive and legislative branches.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear

before you to discuss the implementation of a possible agreement with North

Korea for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear

weapons program. I was deeply involved in the Nunn-Lugar program from

1991 to 1996, a very successful effort established by the Chairman of this Committee

and Senator Nunn. The Nunn-Lugar program accomplished CVID in

Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, as well as the dismantlement and securing of a

large portion of Russia’s nuclear weapons legacy from the Soviet Union. Currently

the methods it pioneered are also at work in Iraq and Libya, and in securing highly

enriched uranium around the world.

We all hope something similar can be accomplished in North Korea. I must begin,

however, by warning that in my estimation we are a long way from an agreement

with North Korea on CVID. I do not know whether at this point North Korea is

susceptible to a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis at all. But President Bush

is correct to give diplomacy a try before moving to other, more coercive paths. The

alternatives to diplomacy are dangerous because they could spark a violent war on

the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, they cannot be fully effective unless others join

us in implementing them. For example, economic penalties cannot be imposed on

North Korea unless China, South Korea, and Russia agree not to undercut them.

This needed international support is not a matter of a ‘‘permission slip,’’ it is critical

to making U.S.-led policy effective. We will not get this support unless the diplomatic

path has been tried and been shown to have failed.

The last time I appeared before this Committee I called for an overhaul of U.S.

counterproliferation capabilities. I argued that President Bush was dead on when

he said that keeping the worst weapons out of the hands of the worst people was

an American president’s highest national security priority. The worst weapons are

nuclear and biological; the worst people are rogue states and increasingly terrorists.

But I also pointed out that U.S. policy in recent years has been focused mostly on

the worst people and far too little on the worst weapons. We have waged a war on

terrorism but have not yet begun a parallel war on weapons of mass destruction

(WMD). The only major action taken against WMD was the invasion of Iraq, an action

which I supported in the firm conviction that Saddam Hussein’s WMD would

be found after the war. But it turns out that pre-war intelligence falsely overstated

Iraq’s WMD capabilities. Meanwhile, as all eyes were on Iraq, North Korea and Iran

plunged forward with their nuclear programs; efforts to secure nuclear materials in

Russia and worldwide proceeded at their pre-9/11 bureaucratic pace; and the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community

continued to give inadequate attention to overhauling their counterproliferation

programs to deal with the age of terrorism.

The most adverse of all these recent developments in counterproliferation has

taken place in North Korea. The North quadrupled its stock of plutonium, in the

most significant proliferation disaster since Pakistan went nuclear in the 1980s

under the leadership of scientist A.Q. Khan. Letting North Korea go nuclear represents

a security catastrophe in no fewer than five ways. First, it would weaken

deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and make war there both more likely and more

destructive. Second, it could lead to a domino effect of proliferation in East Asia as

South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others reconsider their decisions to forego nuclear

weapons. Third, it would undercut the global Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

regime. Fourth, North Korea might sell plutonium, as it sells ballistic missiles. And

fifth, if North Korea collapses we will need to worry about where its plutonium goes

during the upheaval. These last two points alone illustrate why a North Korean nuclear

program is unacceptable to U.S. and international security, because they show

that proliferation to states is also a potential route to sub-state nuclear terrorism.

For these five reasons, the United States must put stopping the nuclear program

first in its priorities when dealing with North Korea—above reducing North Korea’s

conventional forces, and above transforming its repressive political system and backward

economic system. Strategy is about priorities. These other objectives remain

important U.S. goals, but the Bush administration is correct to put nuclear CVID

at the center of its negotiating strategy.

Unfortunately, the U.S. negotiating position has deteriorated significantly since

the crisis began in late 2002, when North Korea’s plutonium program was unfrozen

and its uranium enrichment program revealed. For the eight preceding years, the

8,000 fuel rods containing several bombs’ worth of weapons grade plutonium were

at Yongbyon, where they could be inspected (or, for that matter, destroyed) and

were months away from being converted into bomb form. Now they are out of

Yongbyon, location unknown, and presumably at least some of them have been reprocessed

to extract bomb-ready plutonium.

The U.S. position among other parties in the region has also taken a turn for the

worse. South Korea and China have the power to reward and coerce North Korea—

they possess carrots and sticks—that are at least as potent as ours—if they can be

persuaded to wield them in the nuclear diplomacy. But in the absence of a clear

U.S. negotiating strategy, each of these partners has begun to go its own way.

In South Korea, a younger generation seems to have lost its strategic bearings

entirely, wishing away the North Korean threat and even going so far as to make

the astonishing suggestion that the United States is the greater threat. The older

generation of South Korean leaders has done too little to educate the younger generation

about the South’s actual interests and responsibilities. The United States

has exacerbated this situation through three and a half years of delay in formulating

a negotiating strategy, and by its clumsy handling of its plans to rebase U.S.

forces on the peninsula.

China should apply its full weight to pressuring North Korea to agree to a reasonable

U.S. negotiating position. But in the absence of a clear U.S. position, China

also has been looking the other way as North Korea advances its nuclear program.

In fact, China and South Korea appear to be collaborating closely. This is a symptom

of a larger trend in East Asia, where China’s power and influence grow and

regional states find themselves tempted to align with China and move away from

the United States. Our government’s near-total focus on the Middle East has kept

us from countering this trend towards the erosion of the U.S. strategic position in

East Asia.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I therefore approach my assigned

task in this hearing with grave doubts. But in a spirit of hope, allow me to make

some observations on how the ‘‘Nunn-Lugar method’’ might be applied to implementing

a denuclearization agreement with North Korea.

Nunn-Lugar assistance with CVID is a reasonable ‘‘carrot’’ for the United

States to offer North Korea. This nation—always loath to ‘‘bribe’’ North Korea, and

burned once in the Agreed Framework by North Korean cheating—can hardly be

expected to give North Korea large tangible rewards for stepping back from the nuclear

threshold. It is likely that South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan will do so,

but not the United States. But the U.S. can reasonably offer two carrots. The first

is an intangible: namely, a pledge not to attack North Korea if it foregoes nuclear

weapons. This simply makes explicit what should be our policy anyway. The second

is Nunn-Lugar-like assistance with CVID. Such assistance, like the Nunn-Lugar

program in general, should be seen as an investment in our own security, not a reward to North Korea. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used to call the Nunn-Lugar

program in the former Soviet Union ‘‘defense by other means.’’

While CVID must be the end-state prescribed in any agreement, as a practical

matter this state will be approached in stages. Recall that the Agreed Framework

also prescribed CVID of North Korea’s plutonium infrastructure (its uranium provisions

were not verifiable, and sure enough North Korea cheated on them). The problem

with the Agreed Framework’s plutonium provision was not that it did not have

the right goal, or that it approached that goal in stages. The problem was that implementation

never progressed beyond the first stage, the so-called ‘‘freeze.’’ We

need to make sure any new agreement does not get stuck in an early stage of implementation.

The agreement will need to build in penalties to North Korea for stalling.

On our side, Congress especially will need to support the implementation of the

agreement over time and over successive administrations until CVID is achieved.

With the Agreed Framework, first Congress and then the Clinton administration betrayed

signs of ‘‘buyer’s regret’’ soon after the agreement was signed, and this

played into the hands of North Korea’s desire to stall at the ‘‘freeze’’ stage.

The United States should begin program design for CVID now. The program

design should include technical objectives and milestones, supply and construction

plans, estimated costs, and a program management structure giving clear authority

and accountability to a single U.S. official. This last point is important. Over the

history of the Nunn-Lugar program, its projects have been implemented by Defense,

State, Energy, and Commerce. These departments have developed expertise in these

types of projects, and it would be imprudent not to exploit it for a North Korea program.

But we cannot confront North Korea with the same bureaucratic chaos with

which the states of the former Soviet Union still contend.

The program design should be shown to the North Koreans and their input solicited.

Doing so will smooth things down the road if an agreement is reached, and

it might whet their appetite for such an agreement in the first place.

Obviously a program plan can only be notional at this stage and will need to

be refined as we learn more about North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure. Without a

program plan, it is impossible to estimate costs. A reasonable estimate would be

that the North Korea Nunn-Lugar program would be a factor often smaller than the

former Soviet Union program—that is, tens of millions of dollars per year for a ten

year period.

By far the preferable role for Congressional oversight is to review the program

plan in advance as it considers the overall wisdom of any agreement the executive

branch reaches with North Korea. To the extent possible, we should avoid a situation

in which every stage of implementation and every needed appropriation for assistance

becomes a mini-crisis in U.S. politics. The North will exploit such crises to

stall and re-bargain the agreement. The result will be to the U.S. disadvantage in

the long run. Well-intentioned but totally counterproductive Congressional restrictions

have greatly damaged the denuclearization effort in the former Soviet Union.

To yield complete (the C in CVID) and irreversible (the I in CVID) results, the

‘‘Nunn-Lugar’’ concept for North Korea, like those for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and

Belarus, should cover all portions of its nuclear infrastructure: weapons and materials,

production and storage facilities, R&D centers, and the scientists and workers

who populate it.

Verification (the V in CVID) will be aided by a Nunn-Lugar approach. A cooperative

effort in which the United States is deeply involved, on the ground and in person

with North Korean technologists, will give important insights and confidence to

complement formal verification measures and national intelligence collection.

While in principle other nations in the Six-Party talks could also provide Nunn-

Lugar-type assistance to implement an agreement, it is probably preferable that the

program to implement the agreement be U.S.-only. The United States has the experience

of the existing Nunn-Lugar program under its belt, an enormous incentive

to see CVID succeed, and a disinclination to provide the other types of assistance

to North Korea that China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan might provide.

Elimination of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles can be

added to the agreement and to the resulting Nunn-Lugar-like program, though with

lesser priority than nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons are not much more destructive,

pound for pound or liter for liter, than conventional weapons and hardly deserve

the ‘‘mass destruction’’ designation. Biological weapons are a true WMD, but

the United States must formulate strong counters against biowarfare and bioterrorism

irrespective of North Korea, and those countermeasures—if taken—will likely

provide protection against North Korean bioweapons. Ballistic missiles are a poor

way for an attacker to spend money unless they carry nuclear or biological warheads,

so our concerns about missiles end up being derivative of these weapons.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me close by stressing that policymaking

and implementation are different processes requiring different skills. Too

often our policy is brilliant but when it comes to spending the taxpayers’ money on

complex and novel technical projects, especially in foreign lands, our performance

is less than brilliant. (Joint military operations are fortunately an exception to this

observation.) But when one considers the fumbling in the early years of the Nunn-

Lugar program in the former Soviet Union (to which I can attest personally), the

first year of the Coalition Provisional Authority and ‘‘stability operations’’ in Iraq,

and the first three years of the U.S. Homeland Security program, one can easily see

that successful implementation is not always assured even when the policy objectives

are crystal clear. The complexity of a North Korea CVID program based on

the Nunn-Lugar precedent, together with the inimitable qualities of the North Korean

government, mean that implementation will require stamina and finesse on

the part of both the executive and legislative branches.

It certainly does with me, Mr. Chairman, both on

the up side and on the down side. I am referring to the formulation

that former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used in the North

Korea policy review, in which I participated. We talked of the upward

path and the downward path for North Korea; that is, painting

for them a portrait of how things get better for them if they

forebear in the nuclear area, but also of how things can get worse

for them, and distinctly worse, if they do not. The essence of diplomacy

of the kind in which we are engaged is to create the fork in

the road in which they need to choose that upward path or the

downward path. The more vividly we can portray both of those

paths, the more effective our diplomacy will be. So on the upward

path, I absolutely agree with you that the more we can show them

what a Nunn-Lugar ingredient of a solution might be, what an energy

ingredient of a solution might be, the better will be our test

of whether they are willing to give up their nuclear weapons.

And as you point out, even if diplomacy does not succeed, the

North Korean regime is not going to be around forever, but the plutonium

is, or essentially forever, because plutonium lasts 24,000

years. So even if Kim Jong-il’s regime goes away, we still have the

problem of safeguarding the material his regime made. So the

plans that we devise now would be pertinent in that scenario also.

I think painting the downward path vividly is important as well.

Economic sanctions are on that path. As you know 1994 was the

year of my first acquaintance, within the Department of Defense,

with the North Korean previous nuclear crisis. We did consider, in

different circumstances from today, I will grant, military action

against North Korea’s nuclear program, specifically a strike upon

the Yongbyon complex at that time, because we felt that the consequences

of North Korea going nuclear were so grave that they

were worth the risk attendant upon military action in the Korean

Peninsula. And I do not think that is something that ought to be

taken off the table by the United States now.

If I may just make one other comment. Another thing you said,

with which I agree absolutely and to which I alluded in my statement,

is that threat reductions, stability operations—these are

things that we are not very good at. We are tremendously good at

joint military operations. I am very proud that we are, and that is

the paramount capability that we have for action overseas. But

when it comes to doing other things, we do not always accomplish

them very well. Your idea, in the matter of stability operations,

and also threat reduction, to learn from our experience and bottle,

so to speak, the experience we have in the former Soviet Union for

Nunn-Lugar, and in Bosnia and Iraq for stability operations, for

the future, is terribly important. Otherwise, every time we do this

kind of thing, we are going to stand up all over again and fall down

all over again and have to pick ourselves up. I completely agree

with that point you made also.

Senator, it is not even possible to say whether the

policy has been effective or not, because in my observation, the administration

has been divided within itself for the last few years.

That is the basic reason why a proposal has not

been tabled up until now.

Now they have a proposal tabled.

I do not know whether it is sufficient, but I think

it has the right ingredients in it, namely on our part the offer of,

first of all, the security assurances, which I think are very significant

to North Korea, coming from us. They are intangible. As I

said, I think there is something we should be prepared to offer, and

I think we have substantial leverage with that.

Second, the provision of Nunn-Lugar type assistance with dismantlement,

as I said, is not a reward but is a defense by other

means, as I quoted from Bill Perry to characterize that kind of assistance.

When you get to what else we, the United States, might offer

that is tangible, I think it is still not clear in this proposal, and

it was not clear to me anyway from the testimony just given.

Let me just finish that thought.

One of the strengths, Senator Biden, of the six-party talks and

in the past of working with our allies was that together the portfolio

of things that we, being different countries with different proclivities

and different historical traditions and so forth, are willing

to offer North Korea, and also the penalties that we can impose,

are different for all our different negotiating partners. That is a

strength of the six-party approach. So it may be that Japan, it may

be that South Korea, it may be that Russia, it may be that China

are prepared to do things in the energy field that the United

States, at the end of the day, is not prepared to do. That is fine.

They can still be part of the deal. I am not prepared to say now

that if the United States is not the provider of energy assistance,

that energy assistance will not be an effective part of this package.

So I am comfortable with the mix of ingredients that are in here,

as you characterized. I absolutely agree. I regret that years have

passed and we have not been exploring this path. I think this is

a reasonable mix of things to put in an initial package before North

Korea. Whether they will go for it, as I said, at this point I am not

sure.

I do not think we have been fully on the same page

in the last few years. I hope this begins to put us on the same

page. You are right. Bill Perry was right. No American policy toward

North Korea can succeed unless it has the support of at least

Japan and South Korea. Both in the carrots area and in the sticks

department, as I mentioned earlier, we are stronger if we are working

with them, because they have carrots and they have sticks that

we do not have, and as a phalanx, we are a more powerful force

in dealing with——

May I comment on one thing you said?

I also believe that the fact that our partners and allies

were beginning to stray and seek their own separate channels

to North Korea was a factor that lent urgency to the need for us

to—I will not say change course—but to chart a course in these negotiations

which we had had difficulty doing. So both for that reason,

and because of the paramount reason, which is that North

Korea is reprocessing plutonium, it is urgent to chart this course

and get on with it; to do the experiment of seeing whether North

Korea can, in fact, be persuaded diplomatically to give up its nuclear

program.